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United States v. Wise: Is Failure to Stop for the Police 
a Sentence-Enhancing Crime of Violence? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Wise,1 the Tenth Circuit held that a felony 
conviction under Utah’s so-called “failure-to-stop”2 (for the police) 
statute could be a “crime of violence.”3 In 2007, Michael Charles 
Wise pleaded guilty to felony possession of a firearm;4 the issue for 
the Tenth Circuit was whether his 2006 failure-to-stop conviction 
would qualify as a sentence enhancing “crime of violence” under the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines (“USSG”).5 The Tenth Circuit 
examined the statutory definition for “crime of violence,” as well as 
the comparable term “violent felony,”6 to determine whether Wise’s 
failure-to-stop offense presented a “serious potential risk of physical 
injury to another.”7 The court held that his conviction qualified as a 
“crime of violence,” reading the term broadly and relying on its own 
precedent, United States v. West,8 which had already been partially 
 
 1. 597 F.3d 1141 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 2. The Utah offense is actually designated “[f]ailure to respond to officer’s signal to 
stop.” UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-210 (West Supp. 2010). Because the Tenth Circuit refers to 
the Utah provision as a “failure-to-stop statute,” Wise, 597 F.3d at 1146, this Note will also 
use that phrase to describe the Utah statute and similar statutes from other states that 
criminalize the failure to stop when given a signal to do so by the police. Other states call this 
type of crime by many different names. See, e.g., United States v. Rivers, 595 F.3d 558, 560 
(4th Cir. 2010) (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-750(A) (1976)) (referring to South Carolina’s 
law as “failure to stop for a blue light”); United States v. Tyler, 580 F.3d 722, 724 (8th Cir. 
2009) (citing MINN. STAT. § 609.487 (2009)) (referring to Minnesota’s law as “fleeing a 
peace officer in a motor vehicle”). 
 3.  Wise, 597 F.3d at 1148. 
 4. Id. at 1142. 
 5. Id. at 1144 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) 
(2006)). 
 6. The term “violent felony” is used in the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(e) (2006), and the wording is functionally equivalent to “crime of violence.” See infra 
note 33 and accompanying text. 
 7. Wise, 597 F.3d at 1143–44 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 4B1.2(a)(2) (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 8. 550 F.3d 952 (2008). Interestingly enough, Judge Ebel wrote the Tenth Circuit 
opinion for both West and Wise, so it comes as no shock that he enthusiastically defended his 
prior opinion in West. 
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overruled by the Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in Chambers v. 
United States.9  
The Supreme Court’s recent decisions, like Chambers and Begay 
v. United States,10 unambiguously indicate an unwillingness to 
liberally interpret the statutory language defining “crime of 
violence.”11 Even so, since the Court has not been able to articulate a 
fully workable test to effectively guide the lower courts,12 the result 
has been a circuit split on whether a failure-to-stop conviction should 
qualify as a sentence enhancing “crime of violence.”13 The Supreme 
Court has recently taken notice, granting certiorari in another case to 
review this particular question.14 This Note will argue that while the 
 
 9. 129 S. Ct. 687, 693 (2009) (holding that a criminal’s failure to report to a local 
prison for weekend incarceration, in violation of state law, was not a “violent felony” under the 
Armed Career Criminal Act). 
 10. 553 U.S. 137, 148 (2008) (holding that a DUI charge was not a “violent felony” 
under the Armed Career Criminal Act). 
 11. Because the terms “crime of violence” and “violent felony” are functionally 
interchangeable, for convenience I will predominantly use “crime of violence” to refer to both 
terms. See infra note 33. 
 12. See Hayley A. Montgomery, Comment, Remedying the Armed Career Criminal 
Act’s Ailing Residual Provision, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 715, 719 (2010) (describing the 
Court’s jurisprudence on the issue as “complicated and opaque”). 
 13. In the wake of the Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in Chambers, there are at least 
three circuits that have agreed with the Tenth Circuit that failure-to-stop felonies can be 
considered “crimes of violence.” See Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 429 (7th Cir. 
2010); United States v. Young, 580 F.3d 373, 381 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Harrimon, 568 F.3d 531, 537 (5th Cir. 2009). The Eighth Circuit is itself split on the issue. 
Compare United States v. Tyler, 580 F.3d 722, 725 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that fleeing a 
peace officer in a vehicle under Minnesota law is not a crime of violence), with United States v. 
Hudson, 577 F.3d 883, 886 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that resisting arrest by fleeing in a 
vehicle under Missouri law is a crime of violence). Besides the Eighth Circuit, at least two 
other circuits since 2009 have not allowed failure-to-stop felonies to be considered “crimes of 
violence.” See United States v. Rivers, 595 F.3d 558, 560 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Harrison, 558 F.3d 1280, 1301 (11th Cir. 2009). Since Chambers, at least one circuit has 
issued a non-precedential opinion affirming its prior decision not to consider failure-to-stop 
felonies as “crimes of violence.” United States v. Peterson, No. 07-30465, 2009 WL 3437834, 
at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 27, 2009) (citing United States v. Jennings, 515 F.3d 980, 989–91 (9th 
Cir. 2008)) (“Peterson’s conviction . . . for attempting to elude a police officer, is not 
categorically a crime of violence . . . .”). 
 14. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in September 2010 to review a Seventh 
Circuit opinion, United States v. Sykes, 598 F.3d 334 (7th Cir. 2010). Sykes v. United States, 
131 S. Ct. 63 (2010) (granting certiorari). The Supreme Court will decide the question of 
“[w]hether using a vehicle while knowingly or intentionally fleeing from a law enforcement 
officer after being ordered to stop constitutes a ‘violent felony’ under the Armed Career 
Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).” Question Presented: Sykes v. United States, SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/09-11311qp.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2011). 
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core holding of West (and Wise) was not directly overruled by the 
Supreme Court in Chambers, a careful analysis of the Court’s often 
vague jurisprudence supports the conclusion that a felony conviction 
under Utah’s sweeping failure-to-stop statute should not qualify as a 
“crime of violence.” In contemplating how the Supreme Court 
might deal with this issue, this Note considers a proposal by Judge 
Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit, as well as the possibility that 
the Court might strike the “crime of violence” residual clause on 
account of unconstitutional vagueness. 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On August 22, 2007, Michael Charles Wise was “charged in a 
one-count indictment with being a previously-convicted felon in 
possession of a nine millimeter Smith & Wesson handgun, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).”15 That statute makes it unlawful 
for “any person . . . who has been convicted in any court of, [sic] a 
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . 
[from] possess[ing] in or affecting commerce, any firearm or 
ammunition.”16 Wise ultimately pleaded guilty to the gun possession 
a few months after he was charged.17 
In its Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), the Probation 
Office “recommended that Wise be sentenced under USSG 
2K2.1(a)(4)(a).”18 Under that section, the offender’s base offense 
level19 is raised if “the defendant committed any part of the instant 
offense subsequent to sustaining one felony conviction of . . . a crime 
of violence.”20 Section 4B1.2 of the USSG defines “crime of 
violence” as  
 
 15. United States v. Wise, 597 F.3d 1141, 1142 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 16. Id. at 1142 n.1 (alterations in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006)) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 17. Id.  
 18. Id. at 1142–43. The United States Sentencing Commission provides judges with 
recommended sentences, as found in the USSG, based on the offense level of the instant 
offense, and the criminal history of the offender. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING 
COMMISSION, An Overview of the United States Sentencing Commission 1–3,  
http://www.ussc.gov/About_the_Commission/Overview_of_the_USSC/USSC_Overview_2
0101122.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2011), [hereinafter Commission Overview]. 
 19. Commission Overview, supra note 18, at 2 (“Based on the severity of the offense, the 
guidelines assign most federal crimes to one of 43 ‘offense levels.’ Each offender is also 
assigned to one of six ‘criminal history categories’ based upon the extent and recency of his or 
her past misconduct.”). 
 20. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) (2006). Since Wise was 
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any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment 
for a term exceeding one year, that . . . (1) has as an element the 
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the 
person of another, or (2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or 
extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct 
that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.21 
The PSR noted that Wise had been previously convicted in 2006 
“for failing to stop in response to a police officer’s command to do 
so, which under Utah Code § 41-6A-210 is a third-degree felony.”22 
This failure-to-stop statute reads as follows: 
An operator who receives a visual or audible signal from a peace 
officer to bring the vehicle to a stop may not: (i) operate the 
vehicle in willful or wanton disregard of the signal so as to interfere 
with or endanger the operation of any vehicle or person; or (ii) 
attempt to flee or elude a peace officer by vehicle or other means.23 
Wise objected to the characterization of his 2006 conviction as a 
prior “crime of violence.” The district court disagreed, and Wise 
appealed to the Tenth Circuit.24 
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND 
To help understand the import of the Tenth Circuit’s analysis, 
this Part will give a brief overview of the legislation that created the 
“crime of violence” sentence enhancement, as well as the various 
court decisions that have attempted to interpret that legislation. 
A. Sentence Enhancements for a “Crime of Violence” 
In 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,25 
which created the U.S. Sentencing Commission (“Commission”). 
The Commission is “required to prescribe guideline ranges that 
specify an appropriate sentence for each class of convicted persons.”26 
Although these guidelines are not mandatory, the Supreme Court 
 
convicted under the 2006 version of the USSG, Wise, 597 F.3d at 1143 n.2, this Note will 
refer to that version.  
 21. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a) (2006). 
 22. Wise, 597 F.3d at 1143. 
 23. UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-210(1)(a) (West Supp. 2010). 
 24. Wise, 597 F.3d at 1143. 
 25. Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1987. 
 26. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.2 (2006). 
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has held that “district courts . . . must consult those Guidelines and 
take them into account when sentencing.”27 
That same year, Congress also passed the Armed Career Criminal 
Act (“ACCA”) of 1984.28 This law provided that “any convicted 
felon found guilty of possession of a firearm, who had three previous 
convictions ‘for robbery or burglary,’ was to receive a mandatory 
minimum sentence of imprisonment for 15 years.”29 In 1986, the 
ACCA was “recodified as 18 U.S.C. § 924(e),”30 and several months 
later the scope of the provision was expanded beyond robbery and 
burglary.31 The current language of the statute imposes a “15-year 
mandatory prison term on an individual convicted of being a felon in 
possession of a firearm if that individual has ‘three previous 
convictions . . . for a violent felony.’”32  
The statutory definition for “violent felony” is functionally 
identical to the Commission’s definition of “crime of violence” given 
above;33 consequently, courts have treated the interpretation of one 
as functionally the interpretation of the other.34 For purposes of this 
 
 27. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005) (emphasis added). 
 28. Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. 18, 98 Stat. 2185, (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. app. 
§ 1202(a) (1982 ed., Supp. III)), repealed by Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
99-308, § 104(b), 100 Stat. 459 (1986). 
 29. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 581 (1990) (quoting ACCA § 1202(a)). 
 30. Id. at 582. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Chambers v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 687, 689 (2009) (second emphasis added) 
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2006)). 
 33. Montgomery, supra note 12, at 718 (“Obviously, the Sentencing Guidelines’ 
definition of a crime of violence is nearly identical to the ACCA’s definition of a violent 
felony.”). Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a) (2006) (“The term 
‘crime of violence’ means any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment 
for a term exceeding one year, that . . . (1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or (2) is burglary of a dwelling, 
arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a 
serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”), with 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (“[T]he 
term ‘violent felony’ means any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one 
year . . . that . . . (i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 
force against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of 
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury 
to another . . . .”). 
 34. Montgomery, supra note 12, at 718 (“Not surprisingly, courts have interpreted 
crime of violence and violent felony as interchangeable terms; the case law applies to both. 
Opinions interpreting the ACCA’s violent felony are regularly used to construe the Sentencing 
Guidelines’ crime of violence and vice versa.”); see, e.g., United States v. Rivers, 595 F.3d 558, 
560 n.1 (4th Cir. 2010); see also James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 206 (2007) (noting 
the similar definitions between “crime of violence” and “violent felony”). 
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Note, it will be assumed that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
interpreting the term “violent felony” in the context of the ACCA 
will apply to the interpretation of the Commission’s term “crime of 
violence.” Furthermore, since the terms “crime of violence” and 
“violent felony” are functionally interchangeable, this Note will 
predominantly use “crime of violence” to refer to both terms. 
B. The Categorical Approach to the Enumerated Crimes 
In 1990, the Supreme Court examined the ACCA for the 
purpose of interpreting the definition of burglary,35 which along with 
arson, extortion, and “use of explosives” constitute the enumerated 
crimes that explicitly qualify as sentence-enhancing “crimes of 
violence.” In the case, Taylor v. United States, Arthur Lajuane Taylor 
argued that his prior convictions for burglary should not enhance his 
sentence because “Congress meant to include as predicate offenses 
only a subclass of burglaries whose elements include ‘conduct that 
presents a serious risk of physical injury to another,’ over and above 
the risk inherent in ordinary burglaries.”36  
The Court disagreed, finding that “[t]here never was any 
proposal to limit the predicate offense to some special subclass of 
burglaries that might be especially dangerous.”37 Instead, under a so-
called “categorical approach,” courts are required to look to the 
statute, and not to the specific facts of the offense, to determine 
whether an offense categorically presents a “serious potential risk of 
physical injury to another.”38  
C. The Problematic Residual Clause 
While Taylor provided a somewhat workable test for the four 
enumerated crimes, it did little to interpret the reference in the 
residual clause to a “crime of violence.” The residual clause includes 
crimes, other than the four enumerated offenses, that “otherwise 
involve[] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical 
 
 35. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 577 (1990). 
 36. Id. at 597. 
 37. Id. at 588.  
 38. See id. at 600 (“The Courts of Appeals uniformly have held that § 924(e) mandates 
a formal categorical approach, looking only to the statutory definitions of the prior offenses, 
and not to the particular facts underlying those convictions. We find the reasoning of these 
cases persuasive.” (citations omitted)). 
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injury to another.”39 The Taylor categorical test is much more 
difficult without an established generic definition of an offense 
because different judges are likely to formulate different generic 
definitions, resulting in circuit splits.40 Given this uncertainty, the 
Supreme Court has made several attempts, with mixed results, to 
guide lower courts on how to interpret the residual clause. 
1. The James v. United States approach 
The issue before the Court in James was whether attempted 
burglary, although not one of the four enumerated offenses, would 
qualify as a “crime of violence” under the residual clause.41 The 
Court ultimately held that attempted burglary and  other attempt 
crimes that present a “serious potential risk of physical injury to 
another” are covered by the residual clause.42  
While this five-to-four decision was clear on the result, the 
majority’s interpretation of the relationship between the residual 
clause and the enumerated crimes was confusing at best. The 
majority seemed unsure whether the enumerated crimes were merely 
examples of “crimes of violence” or whether they provided a baseline 
against which to measure the degree of risk of the non-enumerated 
crimes.43 
 
 
 39. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 4B1.2(a)(2) (2006). 
 40. See Chambers v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 687, 694 & n.2 (2009) (Alito, J., 
concurring in judgment). In Chambers, Justice Alito recognized circuit splits over whether the 
following crimes fell within the residual clause: rape, conspiracy to commit burglary, carrying a 
concealed weapon, possessing a sawed-off shotgun as a felon, unauthorized use of a motor 
vehicle, and automobile tampering. Id. (citations omitted). 
 41. James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 195 (2007). 
 42. Id. at 195, 198. 
 43. First, the Court explained that completed burglaries are a “baseline against which to 
measure the degree of risk that a non-enumerated offense must ‘otherwise’ present in order to 
qualify.” Id. at 208. Then a page later the majority stated, “Nothing in the language of 
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) rules out the possibility that an offense may present ‘a serious risk of 
physical injury to another’ without presenting as great a risk as any of the enumerated 
offenses.” Id. at 209. Instead, “As long as an offense is of a type that, by its nature, presents a 
serious potential risk of injury to another, it satisfies the requirements of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)’s 
residual provision.” Id. 
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2. The Begay v. United States revision 
Shortly after James, the Court clarified the relationship between 
the residual clause and the enumerated offenses. The issue before the 
Court in Begay was whether a felony conviction for driving under the 
influence of alcohol (“DUI”) could qualify as a “crime of 
violence.”44 The majority reversed the Tenth Circuit,45 and held that 
the residual clause only covers crimes that are “roughly similar, in 
kind as well as in degree of risk posed, to the [enumerated] 
examples.”46 The majority explained that the enumerated crimes all 
“typically involve purposeful, ‘violent,’ and ‘aggressive’ conduct,”47 
whereas DUI is typically a strict liability offense.48 In other words, in 
order for an offense to fall within the residual clause, it has to be an 
offense that typically involves purposeful, violent, and aggressive 
conduct. The Court reasoned that prior crimes with these 
characteristics “reveal a degree of callousness toward risk . . . [and] 
also show an increased likelihood that the offender is the kind of 
person who might deliberately point the gun and pull the trigger.”49 
Furthermore, without this understanding, the Court feared that a 
harsh sentence enhancement “would apply to a host of crimes which, 
though dangerous, are not typically committed by those whom one 
normally labels ‘armed career criminals.’”50 
3. The Chambers v. United States continuation 
About a year later, in Chambers the Court held that a conviction 
for failure to report to prison did not fall under the residual clause.51 
Even though the charging statute nominally included the failure-to-
report offense as a species of escape, the Court considered failure to 
report as a separate crime.52 Looking just at the failure-to-report 
offense, the Court observed, “the crime amounts to a form of 
inaction, a far cry from the ‘purposeful, violent, and aggressive 
 
 44. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 139 (2008). 
 45.  United States v. Begay, 470 F.3d 964 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 46. Begay, 553 U.S. at 143. 
 47. Id. at 144–45. 
 48. Id. at 145. 
 49. Id. at 146. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Chambers v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 687, 689 (2009). 
 52. Id. at 691. 
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conduct’ potentially at issue” during the commission of one of the 
enumerated offenses.53 Thus, the Court not only continued the 
Begay doctrine, it appeared to reinforce its concern that lower courts 
have been interpreting the residual clause too liberally. 
D. The Tenth Circuit’s Approach to Utah’s Failure-to-Stop Statute 
After Begay, but before Chambers, the Tenth Circuit held in 
United States v. West that a conviction under Utah’s failure-to-stop 
statute fell within the ambit of the residual clause.54 The court 
considered failure to stop as analogous to escape, which made its 
analysis relatively easy since previous Tenth Circuit precedent 
recognized that escape categorically “constitutes conduct that 
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another . . . .”55 
However, the court recognized that the Supreme Court might 
overrule the Tenth Circuit’s categorical approach to escape,56 a 
prediction that ultimately proved correct.57 Perhaps given this 
recognition, the West panel alternatively held that the failure-to-stop 
offense satisfied the new “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” test.58 
First, in finding that the statute required purposeful conduct, the 
court reasoned that “[d]isregarding a signal after receiving it will, in 
the ordinary case, be knowing and deliberate or intentional.”59 
Second, the court found that “[t]here is little doubt that knowingly 
flaunting the order of a police officer is aggressive conduct.”60 Third, 
the court determined that failure to stop is akin to burglary in that 
there is a potential for a violent confrontation, therefore satisfying 
the “violent” prong of the Begay test.61  
 
 53. Id. at 692 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 54. United States v. West, 550 F.3d 952, 960 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 55. Id. at 963 (quoting United States v. Springfield, 196 F.3d 1180, 1185 (10th Cir. 
1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 56. Id. at 963 n.9. 
 57. See Chambers, 129 S. Ct. at 691; United States v. Shipp, 589 F.3d 1084, 1090 n.3 
(10th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that Chambers overruled the Tenth Circuit’s “prior precedent 
characterizing escape as a per se ‘violent felony’ under the ACCA” (citation omitted)). 
 58. West, 550 F.3d at 968–71. 
 59. Id. at 971 (citation omitted). 
 60. Id. at 969. 
 61. Id. at 969–70 (“It is likely to lead, in the ordinary case, to a chase or at least an 
effort by police to apprehend the perpetrator. All of these circumstances increase the likelihood 
of serious harm to the officers involved as well as any bystanders that by happenstance get in 
the way of a fleeing perpetrator or his pursuers.”). 
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IV. THE COURT’S DECISION 
More than a year after West, and in the wake of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Chambers, the Tenth Circuit again reviewed the 
issue of whether Utah’s failure-to-stop offense could qualify as a 
predicate offense under the “crime of violence” residual clause.62 In 
United States v. Wise, Michael Charles Wise argued that Chambers 
undermined the precedential force of West because Chambers 
concluded that not all escape crimes are crimes of violence.63 The 
Tenth Circuit disagreed; instead, it determined that “[t]he 
distinction upon which the Supreme Court in Chambers ultimately 
based its decision is the distinction between crimes of inaction, such 
as a passive failure to report, and crimes requiring action, such as an 
escape from custody.”64 Furthermore, the court reasoned, “it is clear 
that in West, the kinds of escape crimes we were talking about and 
drawing support from were the active, violent escape crimes not at 
issue in Chambers.”65  
The court distinguished the Utah failure-to-stop offense from 
the failure-to-report offense at issue in Chambers. First, the court 
concluded that the failure-to-stop offense requires “deliberate 
action,” which the court described as “a far cry from a mere failure 
to appear at a prison.”66 Second, it observed that the failure-to-stop 
offense would always occur in the presence of police officers, while 
“a failure to report to a penal institution will inherently not involve 
the physical presence of police officers.”67 Third, the Utah offense “is 
far more likely to endanger third parties,” while the failure-to-report 
offense might not involve anyone else at all.68 Finally, while the 
Supreme Court did not see failure to report as posing a serious 
potential risk of harm, the Tenth Circuit saw the violation of Utah’s 
failure-to-stop statute as creating a risk of a confrontation.69 
 
 62. United States v. Wise, 597 F.3d 1141, 1142 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 63. Id. at 1145. 
 64. Id. at 1146. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 1146–47. 
 69. Id. at 1147 (“[T]he requirement that a violation of the Utah statute occur in the 
presence of a police officer ‘poses the threat of a direct confrontation between the police officer 
and the occupants of the vehicle, which, in turn, creates a potential for serious physical injury 
to the officer, other occupants of the vehicle, and even bystanders.’” (quoting United States v. 
West, 550 F.3d 952, 964–65 (10th Cir. 2008))). 
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V. ANALYSIS 
This Note argues that the Tenth Circuit in Wise was probably 
correct in stating that West was not directly overruled; however, this 
assertion was correct only because the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence has been so vague and ambiguous. Moreover, even if 
West is still controlling precedent, it is fundamentally inconsistent 
with the tenor and reasoning of Begay and Chambers. This Note 
argues that the trend of the Court has been to shrink the 
applicability of the “crime of violence” residual clause, and that it is 
probably only a matter of time before the Court forecloses all but the 
most violent and aggressive failure-to-stop offenses from the residual 
clause altogether. Furthermore, this Note considers several 
approaches the Court might take in reviewing this issue, including 
adopting a proposal by Judge Posner as well as the ultimate 
possibility of striking the “crime of violence” residual clause on 
account of unconstitutional vagueness. 
A. Did West Survive Chambers? 
Chambers almost certainly did not directly overrule West. In 
Chambers, the Supreme Court decided to review failure-to-report 
offenses separately from escape offenses, even though the Illinois 
statute lumped them together, treating failure to report as a form of 
escape.70 The Court ultimately held that failure to report was “a form 
of inaction, a far cry from the ‘purposeful, “violent,” and 
“aggressive” conduct’ potentially at issue” when an enumerated 
offense is committed.71 Furthermore, the Court said that “[t]he 
behavior that likely underlies a failure to report would seem less 
likely to involve a risk of physical harm than the less passive, more 
aggressive behavior underlying an escape from custody.”72 In other 
words, the Court held that a more passive and inactive form of 
escape—i.e., failure to report to prison—could not satisfy the Begay 
test.  
 
 
 
 70. Chambers v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 687, 691 (2009). 
 71. Id. at 692. 
 72. Id. at 691. 
DO NOT DELETE 4/5/2011 7:44 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
60 
However, the Court did implicitly overrule the Tenth Circuit’s 
precedent that all escape offenses, whether active or inactive, 
categorically “constitute[] conduct that presents a serious potential 
risk of physical injury to another.”73 Consequently, some lower 
courts have agreed with the Tenth Circuit that Chambers only dealt 
with inactive escapes, leaving active escape offenses untouched, and 
thus still within the residual clause.74 Under this approach, the 
failure-to-stop offense is a species of active escape that was unaffected 
by Chambers.75 However, other courts have been more skeptical, 
arguing that Chambers cannot be so easily distinguished.76 
Ultimately, without further guidance from the Supreme Court, the 
Tenth Circuit may plausibly assert that West was not directly 
overruled, and thus still remains the law of the Tenth Circuit. 
B. The Shrinking Breadth of the Residual Clause 
Even though West, and consequently Wise, nominally remain 
good law in the Tenth Circuit for now, it is important to realize that 
the recent trend of the Supreme Court has been to narrow the scope 
of the residual clause. 
1. James—2007 
When the Court initially reviewed the residual clause in James, 
the majority gave it a fairly generous reading—interpreting it to 
include essentially any crime that happened to present a “serious 
potential risk of physical injury to another.”77 There seemed to be no 
 
 73. West, 550 F.3d at 963 (quoting United States v. Springfield, 196 F.3d 1180, 1185 
(10th Cir. 1999)); see also id. (“[E]very escape scenario is a powder keg, which may or may not 
explode into violence and result in physical injury to someone at any given time, but which 
always has the serious potential to do so.” (quoting United States v. Gosling, 39 F.3d 1140, 
1142 (10th Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 74. See, e.g., Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 423–24 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(“Numerous courts have reaffirmed, however, that an escape from secure custody is not 
analogous to failure to report and, therefore, is not covered by Chambers.”). 
 75. Id. at 424 (“Chambers . . . explicitly distinguished failure to report from escape from 
confinement. Vehicular fleeing, the offense at issue here, is much more similar to the latter. 
While failure to report is a passive crime characterized by inaction, vehicular fleeing necessarily 
involves affirmative action on the part of the perpetrator.” (citations omitted)). 
 76. See, e.g., id. at 434 (Posner, J., dissenting) (“[T]he point of Chambers was that we 
can’t treat all escapes alike.”); United States v. Harrison, 558 F.3d 1280, 1294 (11th Cir. 
2009) (“Chambers rejects the notion that all escapes are created equal. And, likewise, we reject 
the notion that all willful fleeing crimes should be treated equally . . . .”). 
 77. See James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 209 (2007). 
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limitation that the non-enumerated crimes have any similarity to the 
four enumerated crimes in the “crime of violence” definition. 
Instead, it seemed that the enumerated crimes were merely examples 
of crimes that had a certain degree of risk.78 The Court, however, 
was unclear on this point.79 
The dissent, voiced by Justice Scalia, correctly criticized the 
majority’s approach as failing to provide any “guidance concrete 
enough to ensure that the ACCA residual provision will be applied 
with an acceptable degree of consistency by the hundreds of district 
judges that impose sentences every day.”80 Consequently, lower 
court judges have been left “to their own devices in deciding, crime-
by-crime, which conviction ‘involves conduct that presents a serious 
potential risk of physical injury to another.’”81 
2. Begay—2008 
Apparently unsatisfied with the James approach to the residual 
clause, the Court decided Begay less than a year later. Whereas the 
majority in James and the Tenth Circuit in the then-captioned 
United States v. Begay had interpreted the residual clause according 
to its broadest reading,82 the Supreme Court in Begay significantly 
limited its scope. Instead of seeing the enumerated examples as four 
random crimes that merely illustrate a certain degree of risk, the 
Court correctly held that the enumerated crimes were also the kinds 
of crime that Congress wanted to address.83 Under this approach, 
the residual clause only covers crimes that are “roughly similar, in 
kind as well as in degree of risk posed, to the [enumerated] examples 
themselves.”84 
 
 
 
 78. Id. at 198–200. 
 79. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text. 
 80. James, 550 U.S. at 215 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 81. Id. at 216. 
 82. See United States v. Begay, 470 F.3d 964, 973 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Thus, both the 
natural meaning of the statutory language and the apparent statutory purpose support a 
construction of the term violent felony to include felony DWI. Neither the legislative history 
nor canons of construction persuade otherwise.”), rev’d, 553 U.S. 137 (2008). 
 83. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 142–43 (2008). 
 84. Id. at 143. 
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While it is significant that the Court explicitly held that the 
residual clause “covers only similar crimes, rather than every crime 
that ‘presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,’”85 
the Court narrowed the residual clause even more by how it defined 
the commonality of the enumerated crimes. The majority explained 
that the enumerated crimes all “typically involve purposeful, 
‘violent,’ and ‘aggressive’ conduct.”86 With the word “purposeful,” 
the Court immediately removed all negligent and reckless crimes, 
even though many of these crimes would typically present a “serious 
potential risk of physical injury to another.”87 With the words 
“violent” and “aggressive,” the Court underscored that the residual 
clause only covers prior crimes that are typically committed by the 
hardened criminal who would be more likely to “deliberately point 
[a] gun and pull the trigger.”88 
With the Court’s new “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” 
definition, it sent a clear message to the lower courts that the “crime 
of violence” sentencing enhancement should be reserved for very 
serious crimes that are typically committed by hardened criminals. 
Otherwise, the Court feared that a harsh enhancement “would apply 
to a host of crimes which, though dangerous, are not typically 
committed by those whom one normally labels ‘armed career 
criminals.’”89  
3. Chambers—2009 
About a year later, the Court narrowed the residual clause a bit 
more in Chambers when the Court held that a conviction for failure-
to-report to prison did not fall under the residual clause.90 By doing 
this, the Court showed that it was willing to not only buck a clear 
circuit majority,91 but also slice and dice a state statute to determine 
whether the underlying crime actually constituted “purposeful, 
 
 85. Id. at 142 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006)). 
 86. Id. at 144–45 (quoting Begay, 470 F.3d at 980 (McConnell, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part)). 
 87. See id. at 152 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).  
 88. Id. at 146 (majority opinion). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Chambers v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 687, 689 (2009). 
 91. See United States v. Chambers, 473 F.3d 724, 726 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting almost 
unanimous agreement by other courts of appeals), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 687 (2009). 
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violent, and aggressive” conduct.92 Merely labeling an offense as a 
form of escape was not sufficient for it to qualify for the residual 
clause.93  
C. The Likely Fate of Failure-to-Stop Statutes 
The Court’s distinct skepticism about the reach of the residual 
clause might lead to excluding all but the most legitimately 
dangerous failure-to-stop offenses. Although various states have 
failure-to-stop statutes, they disagree over the necessary elements of 
the crime. Some states require other laws to be broken in the course 
of fleeing,94 while others, like Utah, require almost nothing more 
than a mere failure to stop for the police.95 Likewise, some circuit 
courts have held that a failure-to-stop offense must include elements 
of high speed and recklessness to fall within the residual clause.96 
Other courts, like the Tenth Circuit, have held that such elements 
are not required because any flight from the police might involve 
high speed and recklessness.97 
The problem with the Tenth Circuit’s position is that, while the 
Court’s jurisprudence has been “almost entirely ad hoc,”98 
gimmicky,99 and “piecemeal,”100 the Tenth Circuit has disregarded 
the Court’s clear message that it is unhappy with lower courts 
broadly applying the residual clause to crimes that are not typically 
 
 92. See Chambers, 129 S. Ct. at 691. 
 93. See id.; cf. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 588–89 (1990) (“Congress 
intended that the enhancement provision be triggered by crimes having certain specified 
elements, not by crimes that happened to be labeled ‘robbery’ or ‘burglary’ by the laws of the 
State of conviction.”). 
 94. See, e.g., Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 417 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing 625 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-204.1 (Supp. 2010)). 
 95. UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-210(1)(a)(ii) (West Supp. 2010). 
 96. See, e.g., United States v. Harrison, 558 F.3d 1280, 1295 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[A] 
disobedient driver’s failure to accelerate to a high rate of speed or to drive recklessly signals a 
different type of criminal and suggests an unwillingness to engage in violent conduct.”); 
United States v. Tyler, 580 F.3d 722, 725 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 97. See United States v. West, 550 F.3d 952, 964 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[U]nder the stress 
and urgency which will naturally attend his situation, a person fleeing from law enforcement 
will likely drive recklessly and turn any pursuit into a high-speed chase with the potential for 
serious harm to police or innocent bystanders.” (quoting United States v. Kendrick, 423 F.3d 
803, 809 (8th Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 98. James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 215 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 99. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 150 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
judgment). 
 100. Id. 
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violent and aggressive. Instead of heeding this message, the Tenth 
Circuit is willing to engage in a flight of fancy—imagining that 
almost any failure to stop for the police is tantamount to a violent 
and aggressive confrontation with the police that may result in a 
dangerous high speed chase,101 no matter how improbable. In other 
words, the Tenth Circuit rationalizes its decision on little more than 
sheer speculation about what any criminal might do, rather than 
what a hardened criminal typically does. 
However, even if the Tenth Circuit position contradicts the spirit 
of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, the Court will eventually need 
to step in and clarify its position. As mentioned above, the Court will 
have an opportunity this term to decide whether failure-to-stop 
offenses fall within the “crime of violence” residual clause.102 If the 
Court’s past decisions are any indication of its intentions, it will most 
likely narrow the scope of the residual clause even more, possibly by 
limiting the residual clause to only the most legitimately dangerous 
failure-to-stop offenses. However, it remains to be seen whether the 
Court will simply resolve this particular circuit split, or whether it 
will take any more drastic measures to deal with the residual clause in 
general. 
Unless the Court is ready to strike down the “crime of violence” 
residual clause as unconstitutionally vague,103 it will need to hone its 
jurisprudence to further constrain the circuit courts. If the Court 
chooses this second path, this Note recommends that the Court 
consider Judge Richard Posner’s proposal that the Court redefine its 
test so that “purposeful” (as in Begay’s “purposeful, violent, and 
aggressive”) would mean, “trying to harm a person’s person or 
property.”104 As discussed above, the Court in Begay explained that 
the residual clause covers only crimes that are similar in kind and 
type to the four enumerated crimes—burglary, arson, extortion, and 
use of explosives.105 Judge Posner aptly recognized that these are 
essentially crimes that require proof of intent to harm property 
 
 101. See West, 550 F.3d at 964–65. 
 102. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 103. See James, 550 U.S. at 230 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Congress has simply abdicated 
its responsibility when it passes a criminal statute insusceptible of an interpretation that enables 
principled, predictable application; and this Court has abdicated its responsibility when it 
allows that.”). 
 104. Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 434 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J., dissenting). 
 105. See supra notes 44–50 and accompanying text. 
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interests, and which only incidentally may involve harm to persons.106 
Consequently, under this approach, the crimes that fall under the 
residual clause should not permit a lesser standard of proof—i.e., just 
a bare risk of harm to persons—without any underlying intent to 
actually harm persons or property interests. This revision would likely 
prevent lower court judges from speculating whether a particular 
offense, like failure to stop for the police, might result in harm 
because judges would be required to see whether the underlying 
criminal statute expressly required proof of intent to harm persons or 
property.  
However, while this Note believes that Judge Posner’s revision 
would help narrow the “crime of violence” residual clause, this 
approach may not ultimately prevent the seemingly perpetual circuit 
splits concerning the offenses that fall under the residual clause.107 
Obviously, it would help if Congress redrafted the statute to 
eliminate the ambiguities.108 Failing that, the Court could force 
Congress’s hand by striking the statute as unconstitutionally 
vague.109 Since the Court may not be ready to do that, it probably 
will just adopt narrowing revisions on a case-by-case basis. However, 
this case-by-case approach seems to confirm Justice Scalia’s 
prediction that it “will take decades, and dozens of grants of 
certiorari, to allocate all the Nation’s crimes to one or the other side 
of this entirely reasonable and entirely indeterminate line.”110  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Thus, under current precedent, the Tenth Circuit is nominally 
correct to hold that a conviction under Utah’s failure-to-stop statute 
constituted a “crime of violence.” However, this conflicts with the 
Supreme Court’s unequivocal message to the lower courts that the 
“crime of violence” residual clause should be narrowly construed. 
Given the Court’s past treatment of the residual clause, it will most 
likely choose to narrow it further, constraining the residual clause to 
 
 106. See Welch, 604 F.3d at 434. 
 107. See Chambers v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 687, 694 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring in 
judgment). 
 108. Id. at 695 (“At this point, the only tenable, long-term solution is for Congress to 
formulate a specific list of expressly defined crimes that are deemed to be worthy of ACCA’s 
sentencing enhancement.”). 
 109. James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 230 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 110. Id. at 216. 
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cover only the most legitimately dangerous failure-to-stop offenses. 
This Note suggests that the Court adopt Judge Posner’s proposed 
revision to help narrow the residual clause. Ultimately, though, this 
Note recognizes that the Court’s case-by-case approach to dealing 
with the residual clause is futile in preventing perpetual circuit splits, 
and that the Court should seriously consider striking the residual 
clause entirely because of its unconstitutional vagueness. 
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